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DETENTION STATUS REVIEW PROCESS IN
TRANSNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT: AL
MAQALEH V. GATES AND THE PARWAN
DETENTION FACILITY
JODY M. PRESCOTT*
I. INTRODUCTION
From the beginning of the U.S. response to the September
2001 al Qaeda attacks upon New York and Washington,
D.C., one issue which has continuously drawn the world‘s
attention is the long-term detention by the U.S. of individuals
whom it claims represent a threat to the U.S. because of their
actions and links with al Qaeda or affiliated terrorist
organizations. Among the questions raised in both the U.S.
and the international community are whether and how long
these individuals could be lawfully held, and what sort of
process should be provided to determine whether they should
be released from detention. Arguments as to the legal status
of the detainees and the legal characterization of their
respective detention sites undergird these questions. In the
case of Fadi al Maqaleh v. Gates,1 four non-U.S. detainees
held by the U.S. in a military detention facility on Bagram
Airfield, Afghanistan,2 brought habeas corpus petitions
*

Colonel, U.S. Army Judge Advocate General‘s Corps, Assistant
Professor of Law and Deputy Director, Center for the Rule of Law, U.S.
Military Academy, and Chief Legal Advisor for the International Security
Assistance Force in Kabul, Afghanistan, during 2008-2009. This article
expresses my personal views and does not necessarily reflect the official
positions of either the U.S. Military Academy or the U.S. Army. I wish to
thank Professors Tim Bakken, John Dehn and Mark Welton of the U.S.
Military Academy Department of Law for their invaluable advice and
comments, and especially my family for their unwavering support and
sacrifice during my deployment to Afghanistan.
1
Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009).
2
Formerly known as the Bagram Theater Internment Facility
(hereinafter ―BTIF‖). As of late 2009, detention operations are now

34

2010

Detention Status Review Process

35

before the D.C. District Court. In ruling on the government‘s
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the D.C. District
Court decided that non-Afghan detainees captured outside of
Afghanistan and held at the detention facility have the right to
have their habeas corpus petitions heard by U.S. courts, under
the U.S. Supreme Court‘s earlier decision regarding a
Bosnian detainee held at Guantanamo Naval Station,
Boumediene v. Bush.3 On an interlocutory appeal, the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court, and
granted the government‘s motion to dismiss.4 The circuit
court‘s ruling, however, because it was on a motion to
dismiss, substituted its evaluation of the factors set out in
Boumediene for that of the district court.5 Most importantly
for this article, although the circuit court found in the
government‘s favor, it specifically rejected an argument put
forth by the government that the determinative factor in
deciding whether habeas corpus protection extended to the
detainees at the detention facility was whether the facility
was subject to the de facto sovereignty of the U.S.6
Despite the circuit court's decision, and in light of the
district court's decision to allow the petitioners to amend their
habeas corpus petitions, the evolving nature of detainee
conducted in a new, modern detention complex known as the Parwan
Detention Facility.
3
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
4
Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (C.A.D.C. 2010). Petitioners'
joint motion for panel rehearing on grounds that the U.S. plan "to transfer
the Bagram prison facility to Afghan control" undermined the Circuit
Court's rationale in its decision was denied, but the Circuit Court stated
that its denial did not prejudice "petitioners' ability to present this
evidence to the district court in the first instance." Al Maqaleh v. Gates,
No. 095265 (D.C. Cir. July 23, 2010). In February 2011, the District
Court granted petitioners' joint motion to present this evidence. Al
Maqaleh v. Gates, No. 06-1669 (D.D.C Feb. 15, 2011). The U.S. plan to
transfer the Parwan Detention Facility to Afghan control is described in a
filed declaration of the Department of Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Detainee Policy. Declaration of William K. Lietzau, Civil Action No.
06-CV-1669 (JDB), Dec. 17, 2010 (hereinafter "Lietzau Declaration"),
available at http://www.lawfare.blog.com/wpcontent/uploads/2011/02/maqaleh-lietzau-declaration.pdf.
5
Id. at 94.
6
Id.
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operations and the importance of these issues to individual
detainees suggest that there will be continuing litigation in
this area. Recently, however, Afghanistan and the U.S. have
agreed upon a process by which responsibility for the Parwan
Detention Facility will be transferred eventually to Afghan
control, possibly as early as January 2011.7 Although such a
transfer could moot the specific issues raised in al Maqaleh,8
the question as to the proper standards to be applied in
determining whether individuals detained by the U.S. military
in the conflict with al Qaeda and affiliated groups should
remain in detention would likely still be unresolved. This
article is critical of both the district court and circuit court
opinions, and argues that the extension of the right of habeas
corpus to individuals who were apprehended outside the U.S.
and who have always been held in detention outside the U.S.,
or in areas not so effectively under its complete control such
that they are tantamount to being U.S. territory, is
unwarranted under Boumediene and international law, and
ignores the operational realities of the conflict in which the
U.S. is currently engaged against al Qaeda and affiliated
groups. The need for the executive to be given appropriate
latitude to promulgate measures to deal with these realities,
although reflected in the judicial deference traditionally
7

See Lietzau Declaration, supra note 4; see also Allan Cullison, U.S.
Set to Open New Afghan Prison, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2009, at A6,
available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125832165575649413.html?KEYWORD
S=US+Set+to+Open+New+Afghan+Prison#printMode. The task force
which operates the facility has an Afghan National Army deputy
commander, and has begun integrating Afghan legal processes into its
operation. Over 200 detainees had been released under the new detention
status review procedure as of mid-June 2010. LuCella Ball, Update on
Detainee Operations in Parwan, ISAF, June 16, 2010, available at
http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/news/update-on-detainee-operations-inparwan.html.
8
Once the facility is under Afghan control, detainees will be
allowed to challenge their continued detention in Afghan courts using
Afghan judicial procedures. Afghan inmates can challenge detention,
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Jan. 12, 2010, available at
http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-world/afghan-inmates-canchallenge-detention-20100112-m2y3.html.
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accorded to the executive in foreign affairs,9 does not mean,
however, that detainees in this fight should be held
indefinitely without meaningful review of their status to
determine whether and when they should be released. Rather,
this article argues that the new procedures set in place by the
Department of Defense (hereinafter, ―DOD‖) to provide an
enhanced review process of detainee status at the Parwan
Detention Facility10 are in keeping with both domestic and
international law. Further, the process afforded also addresses
the functional need to effectively manage the detainee
population in a way that minimizes the potential for
radicalization and despair among the detainees,11 reduction in
the logistical costs of maintaining a detention facility in an
active combat area, and promotion of the efficient collection
of intelligence and the safety of military personnel in the
field. Even if circumstances regarding the Parwan Detention
Facility evolve to the point where the detention status review
mechanism is no longer an issue of U.S. law because
detainees are no longer in U.S. custody, the new Parwan
Detention Facility procedures provide a level of process,
transparency and regularity that make them a model for
future U.S. military detention operations in the continuing
fight against al Qaeda and its affiliates.
This article will first set out a brief history and description
of the airfield at Bagram and the detention facilities there.
9

See Regan v. Wald, 104 S.Ct. 3026, 3038 (1984).
Enclosure to Letter from Phillip Carter, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Detainee Policy, to Senator Carl Levin, (July 14,
2009), in ―Detainee Review Procedures at Bagram Theater Internment
Facility (BTIF), Afghanistan‖ [hereinafter ―Detainee Review
Procedures‖] at 1, available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wpcontent/uploads/2009/09/US-Bagram-brief-9-14-09.pdf. The circuit court
based its decision on the procedures that were in place at the time of the
government‘s appeal, not the new Detainee Review Procedures. Al
Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 96 n.4 (C.A.D.C. 2010).
11
Once it became apparent to Iraqi detainees that there was a
transparent process that resulted in releases from detention, the degree of
misconduct by the detainees decreased markedly, and there was a
noticeable increase in morale amongst them. Interview with Lieutenant
Colonel Mark Wellman, former Rule of Law and Political/Military
Advisor to Task Force 134 (Iraq Detention Operations) (Mar. 23, 2010).
10
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Second, it will explore the standards under international law
and the implementation of national regulations by which the
detention status of individuals detained by U.S. military
forces is determined, when such individuals may be released
from detention, and the significance of the evolving concept
of transnational armed conflict to these determinations. Third,
it will review the U.S. Supreme Court‘s decision in
Boumediene, explore the Court‘s analysis in reaching its
decision, and identify what the Court found to be the most
important factors in terms of applying its analysis to these
types of detainee cases. The fourth part of the article will do
the same for the D.C. District Court‘s decision in al Maqaleh,
and will specifically note where the decision appears to
misapply the Boumediene analysis and to find facts not in
keeping with the actual situation of the Parwan Detention
Facility. Fifth, this article will review the D.C. Circuit
Court‘s formulation of the Boumediene analysis in the same
fashion. Sixth, this article will describe the new status
determination procedures in detail and explain why they are
sufficient to obviate the need for the extension of the
Suspension Clause12 to the Parwan Detention Facility.
Finally, were the Suspension Clause deemed applicable to the
Parwan Detention Facility, this article will explain why these
procedures would be an adequate substitute for habeas corpus
proceedings, and why they could serve as an adequate model
for current and future U.S. military detention operations
outside the U.S. in cases of transnational armed conflict
between the U.S. and non-state actors.
II. THE PARWAN DETENTION FACILITY
The Parwan Detention Facility is located on Bagram
Airfield, which is approximately 40 miles northeast of Kabul,
Afghanistan. The airfield was a major staging area for Soviet
12

―The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion, the public
Safety may require it.‖ U.S. CONST., art. I, §9. The writ was suspended,
for example, during Shays Rebellion in Massachusetts in 1786 and during
the Civil War in 1863. WILLIAM WINTHROP, WINTHROP‘S MILITARY LAW
AND PRECEDENTS, 2D ED., 1291-94 (1896).
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forces following the Soviet invasion in 1979.13 During the
Soviet occupation significant environmental damage
occurred, and during the course of the Soviet war against the
mujahedeen and the subsequent conflict between the
mujahedeen themselves, the airfield suffered significant
physical damage including large amounts of unexploded
ordnance and uncleared minefields.14 U.S. and allied troops
began using the airfield in November 2001,15 and in early
2002, began using an aircraft machine shop as a detention
facility, which in time became the BTIF.16 A new set of
buildings, the Parwan Detention Facility, was completed in
2009 and significantly improved the living standards for the
detainees held there.17 The International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) regularly visits the Bagram Airfield
detention operations, and has been doing so since 2002.18
Apparently at the suggestion of the ICRC, visitations and

13

Afghanistan – Airfields, GLOBAL SECURITY,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/airfield.htm
(last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
14
Environmental Conditions at Bagram Airfield – Information for
Health Care Providers (HCPs), CHPPM (June 2004), http://chppmwww.apgea.army.mil/news/BagramAirfield_ServiceMembers.pdf.
15
Id.
16
Tim Golden, In U.S. Report, Brutal Details of 2 Afghan Inmates‘
Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2005, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/20/international/asia/20abuse.html.
17
Bagram Detention Center (Afghanistan), Times Topics, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 2009, available at
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/b/bagram_air
_base_afghanistan/index.html?scp=1spot&sq=bagram%20detention%20center&st=cse.
18
International Committee of the Red Cross, Persons detained by the
US in relation to armed conflict and the fight against terrorism – the role
of the ICRC, U.S., Operational update, ICRC, Oct. 26, 2009,
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/united-states-detention
(last visited Feb. 10, 2010). See also Golden, supra note 16; Declaration
of Colonel James W. Gray, Al Maqaleh v. Robert Gates, et al., Civil
Action No. 06-CV-01669 (JDB), Mar. 3, 2007, at 4, ¶ 10 [hereinafter
―Gray Declaration‖], available at
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/topics/bagram/Affidavit.pdf.
―Additionally, representatives of the Government of Afghanistan have
access to Afghan detainees at the BTIF.‖ Gray Declaration, at 4, ¶ 10.
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video teleconferences have been set up to allow detainees to
meet or at least converse with their family members.19
Serious cases of detainee mistreatment occurred early in
the BTIF‘s existence, and two detainees died from brutal
maltreatment while in custody in 2002.20 The investigations
into these deaths resulted in a number of courts-martial, some
of which ended in convictions.21 Since 2005, detainees have
been treated in accordance with the Detainee Treatment Act
(DTA), which, inter alia, restricts interrogation methods to
those found in approved U.S. Army doctrine and sets out
prohibited practices in terms of detainee treatment.22 More
recent allegations have been made in the accounts of former
detainees, who claim they were subjected to harsh treatment
while being held in an interrogation facility not part of the
Parwan Detention Facility and not open to ICRC inspection.23
Currently, the Parwan Detention Facility holds approximately
750 detainees, the majority of whom are apparently Afghan
nationals captured within Afghanistan.24 A small number,

19

Persons detained by the US in relation to armed conflict and the
fight against terrorism – the role of the ICRC, supra note 18.
20
Golden, supra note 16.
21
Holly Manges Jones, New charges filed in Afghan prisoner abuse
investigation, JURIST, Sept. 22, 2005, available at
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2005/09/new-charges-filed-in-afghanprisoner.php.
22
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1001–
1006 (2005) [hereinafter ―DTA‖], available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/cpquery/T?&report=hr359&dbname=109&., referencing Field
Manual 34-52: Intelligence Interrogation, Department of the Army (1992)
[hereinafter ―FM 34-52‖], available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm34-52.pdf. The treatment standards
are set out in FM 34-52, at 1-7 through 1-8, id.
23
Joshua Partlow and Julie Tate, 2 Afghans allege abuse at U.S. site,
WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 2010, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/11/27AR2009112703438.html.
24
Alissa J. Rubin and Sangar Rahmi, Bagram Detainees Named by
U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2010, at A6, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/17/world/asia/17afghan.html?scp=1&s
q=bagram%20detainees%20named%20by%20us&st=cse.
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including Mr. al Maqaleh, are non-Afghan nationals who may
have been brought there from third countries.25
The presence of U.S. forces in Afghanistan occurs under
one of two different legal regimes, or status of forces
agreements (SOFAs). The status of military personnel who
are part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the original
U.S. mission in Afghanistan,26 is set out in an exchange of
diplomatic notes between the U.S. and Afghanistan.27 Under
this arrangement, Afghanistan agrees to waive criminal
jurisdiction over these personnel, and to allow U.S. personnel
and equipment freedom of movement into and within
Afghanistan to conduct operations without the need to pay
taxes and duties or to obtain visas.28 Specifically, U.S.
personnel are ―accorded a status equivalent to that accorded
to the administrative and technical staff‖ of the U.S.
Embassy, and are immune to Afghan criminal jurisdiction.29
The Parwan Detention Facility is considered an OEF mission.
The other legal regime governing the presence of U.S.
personnel is found in the Military Technical Agreement
(MTA) between the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) and Afghanistan.30 The majority of U.S. forces in
Afghanistan, and almost all of the international forces, are
covered by the MTA.31 Under its terms, Afghanistan has
25

See Gray Declaration, supra note 18, at 6-7, ¶¶ 18-20. According
to Colonel Gray, Mr. al Maqaleh was captured in Zabul Province,
Afghanistan. Id. at 7, ¶ 20.
26
Richard W. Stewart, The United States Army in Afghanistan –
Operation Enduring Freedom, Oct. 2001-Mar. 2002, CENTER FOR
MILITARY HISTORY, CHM PUB. 70-83-1 (2003).
27
Embassy of the United States of America, Diplomatic Note No.
202, entered into force May 28, 2003, 2002 U.S.T. LEXIS 100
[hereinafter ―Diplomatic Note No. 202‖].
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Military Technical Agreement Between the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Interim Administration of Afghanistan
(Interim Administration), Jan. 4, 2002, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, available
at http://www.operations.mod.uk/fingal/isafmta.pdf. [hereinafter ―MTA‖].
31
International Security Assistance Force, Troop numbers and
contributions, http://www.isaf.nato.int/en/troop-contributingnations/index.php (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). [hereinafter ―Troop
Numbers‖].
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waived criminal, tax and customs jurisdiction over ISAF
forces and has afforded them complete freedom of movement
across its borders and within the country.32 The U.S. occupies
Bagram Airfield under a lease with the Afghan government,
which allows its use until the completion of the U.S.
mission.33 The lease allows the U.S. to essentially sublet
portions of the airfield for use by others, including ISAF,
34
and the ISAF Regional Command East headquarters and
other subordinate ISAF units are located on the airfield.35
Bagram Airfield is an austere location, and its
concentration of military personnel and equipment make it a
frequent target for Al Qaeda and Taliban attacks.36
Accordingly, the U.S. maintains a very strong security
posture in guarding the airfield. As U.S. forces have steadily
increased in number during the course of the conflict, Bagram
Airfield has grown in size and importance to the allied
effort.37 Many civilian workers from Afghanistan are
employed on the airfield, and Afghanistan retains jurisdiction
over these individuals and other non-OEF and non-ISAF
personnel.38 As noted supra, an effort has begun to transfer
the responsibility for the Parwan Detention Facility to Afghan
32

MTA, supra note 30, Art. 4, ¶ 3; Annex A, Section 1, (1)-(3).
ISAF personnel have the status of experts on mission. Id.
33
Gray Declaration, supra note 18, Exhibit 1, Lease Agreement, ¶ 4.
34
Id. at ¶ 3.
35
Troop numbers, supra note 31. ―Each nation separately controls
access to its respective compound on the Airfield.‖ Gray Declaration,
supra note 16, at 3, ¶ 7.
36
FoxNews.com, Bagram in Afghanistan Turning Into ‗Boom
Town,‘ ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 2, 2009,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,570994,00.html (last visited Feb.
10, 2010); Sami Yousafzai, 2 U.S. Soldiers Killed in Bagram Attack, CBS
NEWS, June 21, 2009,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/06/21/terror/main5101364.shtml?ta
g=mncol;lst;1 ; Joseph Giordono, Bagram attacks highlight security
concerns, STARS AND STRIPES, Mar. 7, 2009,
http://www.stripes.com/news/bagram-attacks-highlight-security-concerns1.88970 (mortar round hits detention facility).
37
Chuck Crumbo, Bagram Airfield keeps growing, THE STATE, Oct.
19, 2009, http://www.thestate.com/2009/10/19/989515/bagram-airfieldkeeps-growing.html.
38
See Gray Declaration, supra note 18, at 3, ¶¶ 7, 8.
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control, but the timing of the eventual turnover will likely
depend not only on the politics of the Afghan-U.S. alliance
but also on the need to properly train and equip Afghan
personnel to perform their duties.39
III. DETENTION REVIEW STANDARDS AND PROCESSES
The transnational conflict involving al Qaeda and its
affiliates spans the globe, and has resulted in the continuing
deployment of U.S. armed forces on a commensurate scale.
Many commentators believe, however, that the proper way to
deal with such non-state actors is through law enforcement
methods and techniques rather than the use of military armed
force.40 For example, some commentators and scholars
question the use of Predator drones by the U.S. to launch
missiles against members of al Qaeda or the Taliban outside
Afghanistan, such as in Pakistan41 and particularly in
Yemen42 as unlawful uses of force. This position is not
without merit under widely accepted perspectives of
international law.43
39

Peter Graff, Afghans agree to take over U.S. prison at Bagram,
REUTERS, Jan. 9, 2010, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6081IN20100109. The Afghan
National Army Military Police School recently graduated its first class of
over 200 corrections officers, who are to work with U.S. soldiers at the
Parwan Detention Facility. Bob Everdeen, First Afghan Corrections
Officers Graduate in Parwan, ISAF, May 7, 2010, available at
http://www.isaf.nato.int/en/article/news/first-afghan-corrections-officersgraduate-in-parwan.html.
40
See Ved. P. Nanda, International Law Implications of the United
States‘ ‗War on Terror,‘ 37 DENV. J. INT‘L L. & POL‘Y, 513, 513-14
(2009).
41
Alston says drone attacks on Pakistan-Afghanistan border may
violate international law, N.Y.U. SCHOOL OF LAW NEWS, available at
http://www.law.nyu.edu/news/ALSTON_UN_GENERALASSEMBLY.
42
Mary Ellen O‘Connell, To Kill or Capture Suspects in the Global
War on Terror, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT‘L L. 325, 326 (Spring 2003).
43
Arguably, if such killings are not conducted by armed forces
operating under international humanitarian law, they are extrajudicial
killings, and possibly represent a resurrection of the practice of outlawry
in an international context. The drones in question apparently belong to
the CIA, are operated by CIA employees, engage targets based upon a
CIA conducted targeting process, and are authorized by a Presidential
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As shown by al Qaeda attacks even before September
2001,44 however, the effects45 generated by al Qaeda and
associated organizations can be equivalent to those ordinarily
resulting from the use of a state military force conducting an
armed attack. Further, al Qaeda‘s operations are decentralized
on an international scale, and rely a great deal upon the
internet for coordination, training, recruitment, and
operations.46 These operations can all occur and effects can
be created and facilitated at great distances beyond areas in
which opposing forces are actually exchanging small arms
fire within a certain set of national borders. Concerns about
the effects that could be created through the use of cyberterrorism in particular highlight how vastly different the
legal finding that the individuals are a continuing threat to U.S. persons or
interests. Greg Miller, U.S. Citizen in CIA‘s Cross Hairs, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
31, 2010, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jan/31/world/la-fgcia-awlaki31-2010jan31. As noted infra note 48, a U.S. justification for
these actions could be national self-defense, although they are not
conducted by combatants as required by Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 43, June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S 609 [hereinafter ―AP I‖]. This does not mean that
the CIA employees would be war criminals under AP I, rather, they
would be unprivileged combatants subject to possible domestic criminal
jurisdiction for these killings. If the common law of war were to be
applied instead, they could possibly be tried as war criminals for these
unprivileged killings. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 693-95
(Thomas, J., dissenting). See also note 49 infra.
44
See Josh White, Al-Qaeda Suspect Says He Planned Cole Attack,
WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 2007, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/03/19/AR2007031900653.html.
45
In the context of the developing military operational concept of
Effects Based Approaches to Operations, an ―effect‖ is a change in the
perception, behavior or capability of a target. Effects can be generated
either ―kinetically,‖ such as through a missile strike, or ―non-kinetically,‖
through the use of information operations, for example. Jody M. Prescott,
The Development of NATO EBAO Doctrine: Clausewitz‘s Theories and
the Role of Law in an Evolving Approach to Operations, 27 PENN STATE
INT‘L L. REV. 125, 127-35 (2008).
46
See Dorothy E. Denning, Terror‘s Web: How the Internet is
Transforming Terrorism, 3-5, to be published in HANDBOOK ON INTERNET
CRIME, (Y. Jewkes and M. Yar, eds. 2009), available at
http://faculty.nps.edu/dedennin/publications/Denning-TerrorsWeb.pdf.
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modern international security environment is, in an
operational sense, from the one in which the 1949 Geneva
Conventions were negotiated.47 In many instances, only the
resources available to armed forces may have the capability
to effectively engage these non-state actors who often find
haven in troubled or failed states. Given the speed and stealth
with which modern terrorists can generate catastrophic armed
force-like effects, states might claim the use of armed force
against non-state actors in areas beyond any kinetic
battlefield to be valid measures in self-defense.48

47

See, e.g., Clay Wilson, Botnets, Cybercrime, and Cyberterrorism:
Vulnerabilities and Policy Issues for Congress, CRS REPORT FOR
CONGRESS, Jan. 29, 2009, CRS-2-26.; Victoria Baranelsky, What is
cyberterrorism? Even experts can‘t agree, THE HARVARD LAW RECORD,
Nov. 6, 2009, available at http://www.hlrecord.org/news/what-iscyberterrorism-even-experts-can-t-agree-1.861186, See also Robert
Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal
and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1095 (2008).
48
The CIA‘s apparent use of drones to conduct such attacks is
reported to be ―based on a legal finding signed after the Sept. 11 attacks
by then-President George W. Bush,‖ and the standard used to decide
whether to target an individual is whether that person is ―deemed to be a
continuing threat to U.S. persons or interests.‖ Miller, supra note 43. The
issue of whether national self defense is available as a legal basis for
conducting such attacks against non-state actors within the territory of a
third country when the non-state actors are not in effective control of third
state territory is unsettled. The U.S. position, as set out by U.S. State
Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh, however, is that ―. . . [I]t is the
considered view of this administration . . . that targeting practices,
including lethal operations conducted with the use of unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs), comply with all applicable law, including the laws of
war . . . As recent events have shown, Al Qaeda has not abandoned its
intent to attack the United States, and indeed continues to attack us. Thus,
in this ongoing conflict, the United States has the authority under
international law, and the responsibility to its citizens, to use force,
including lethal force, to defend itself . . . In U.S. operations against Al
Qaeda and its associated forces – including lethal operations conducted
with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles – great care is taken to adhere to
these principles [distinction and proportionality] in planning and
execution, to ensure that only legitimate objectives are targeted and that
collateral damage is kept to a minimum.‖ Sheila Ward, U.S. State Dept.
Legal Adviser [sic] Lays Out Obama Administration Position on
engagement, ―Law of 9/11,‖ AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL

46

Trends and Issues in Terrorism and the Law

Vol.5

Justifying such measures on this basis, however, does not
settle questions regarding the applicable standards governing
kinetic and non-kinetic uses of force, including detention, in
these situations.49 From an empirical perspective, certain
commentators have noted that over the course of this lengthy
conflict there has been a convergence between the
international humanitarian law detention review standards
and processes that one would find in international armed
conflict, and the human rights-oriented detention review
standards and processes that one would find in domestic or
even international criminal law proceedings.50 This
convergence has been incremental, and responsive in large
part to international politics and litigation in U.S. courts.51
This convergence is more than just a question of politics and
judicial decisions on the reach of executive power – treaty
and customary international humanitarian law provide little
detail as to what the standards and processes for detention
review are, and therefore allow states a significant degree of
latitude in fashioning their own measures.52
Traditionally, the degree to which detainees were entitled
to have the status of their detentions reviewed (if at all)
depended in large part upon the classification of the armed
conflict during which they were being held. In certain cases,
however, classification itself is controversial. For purposes of
determining the applicability of Common Articles 253 and 354
LAW, Mar. 25, 2010, available at
http://www.asil.org/files/KohatAnMtg100325.pdf.
49
The CIA drone attacks are apparently conducted using the same
international humanitarian law principles that military forces would use,
such as necessity and proportionality. Id. However, non-military
operatives conducting such operations would appear to be unprivileged
combatants, and the killing of another in armed conflict without having
privileged status would appear to be a war crime under U.S. law. See
Charlie Savage, "Deal Averts Trial in Disputed Guantanamo Case,"
NYTimes.com, Oct.25, 2010, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/26/us/26gitmo.html.
50
Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 47, at 1080-82.
51
Id. at 1112-22.
52
Id. at 1090.
53
―Art 2. In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in
peace time, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war
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of the 1949 Geneva Conventions55 respectively, international
armed conflicts are defined as those occurring between
or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of
the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by
one of them.‖ International Committee of the Red Cross, International
Humanitarian Law - Treaties, Convention (III) relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 12 Aug.1949,
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/6fef85
4a3517b75ac125641e004a9e68 (last visited Mar. 20, 2010).
54
―Art 3. In the case of armed conflict not of an international
character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,
each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the
following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities,
including members of armed forces who have laid down
their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness,
wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse
distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith,
sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this
end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at
any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to
the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of
all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular,
humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of
executions without previous judgment pronounced by a
regularly constituted court affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared
for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the
International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its
services to the Parties to the conflict.
Id.
55

Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter ―Geneva Convention I‖]; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
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states.56 Non-international armed conflicts are defined as all
others occurring within the boundaries of a state.57 For
certain state actors and commentators, the modern
phenomenon of transnational armed groups like al Qaeda,
capable of applying armed force on the scale of state armed
forces, challenges the usefulness of this distinction, and
leaves the applicable standards governing the use of armed
force and treatment of detainees captured during such
conflicts in question.58
Others believe that the existence of groups such as al
Qaeda does not mean that the current structure of
international humanitarian law requires revision to provide an
appropriate legal regime regulating the use of force and
ensuring the protection of civilians in today‘s security
environment. Rather, customary international humanitarian
law applies when terrorists engage in international or noninternational armed conflict.59 This view, however, appears
premised on the use of an unrealistically high threshold of
what constitutes armed force, and the view that unless a
transnational armed group is actually directly participating in
hostilities within the borders of a country suffering a nonU.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter ―Geneva Convention II‖];
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter ―Geneva
Convention III‖]; and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter ―Geneva Convention IV‖].
56
International Committee of the Red Cross, International
Humanitarian Law – Treaties and Documents, Convention (IV) relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 Aug. 1949,
Commentary, Part I: General Provisions, Article 3 – Conflicts Not of an
International Character, at 30, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/380600006?OpenDocument (last visited Feb. 10, 2010) [hereinafter ―ICRC
Art. 3 Commentary‖].
57
Id.
58
See, e.g., An interview with John Yoo, author of ‗The Powers of
War and Peace: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs after 9/11,‘ U. CHI.
PRESS, http://www.press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/960315in.html (last
visited Mar. 22, 2010).
59
See Gabor Rona, Interesting Times For International
Humanitarian Law: Challenges from the ‗War on Terror,‘ 27 FLETCHER
F. WORLD AFF. 55, 57-63 (Summer/Fall 2003).
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international armed conflict, the group and its members are
not lawful targets of armed force.60 The idea that customary
international humanitarian law should apply in circumstances
other than international or non-international armed conflict is
seen as ―either wittingly or unwittingly calling for expansion
of the concept of armed conflict, or the expansion of the
scope of application of humanitarian law beyond armed
conflict.”61 This perspective presumably would then turn to
human rights law to fill in the gaps between the two kinds of
armed conflict recognized in the 1949 Geneva Conventions.62
Review of the negotiation history of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, however, shows that the scope of armed
conflict was understood to be greater than the eventual
definitions of international and non-international armed
conflict, and that the focus on these two types of armed
conflict was not the result of a deliberate decision to define
armed conflict. Rather, they represent the types of armed
conflict to which the party-states were willing to apply the
provisions of the conventions. The commentaries show that
the original position of the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) going into the diplomatic conference
preceding the negotiations on the 1949 Geneva Conventions
would have applied Common Article 3 across national
borders, in ―all cases of armed conflict which are not of an
international character, especially cases of civil war, colonial
conflicts, or wars of religion.‖63
This position was based in part upon the ICRC‘s
successful efforts to achieve recognition of international
humanitarian principles in Upper Silesia by the parties to the
60

See id. at 63-64. State actors might be inclined to reject this
approach because it complicates the application of armed force which
might be the most effective way they have to deal with the threat of a
modern transnational armed group like al Qaeda.
61
Id. at 63.
62
See Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 47, at 1093; see also Undue
Process, An Examination of Detention and Trials of Bagram Detainees in
April 2009, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (Nov. 2009),
http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/HRF-Undue-Process-Afghanistanweb.pdf.
63
ICRC Art. 3 Commentary, supra note 56, at 30.
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ethnic conflict in that area after the First World War.64 Upper
Silesia, a part of Germany prior to the First World War, was
to become part of Poland under the Treaty of Versailles.65
Strong German protests and open armed violence between the
German and Polish paramilitary groups and ethnic
populations across the respective national borders and
throughout the region scuttled this plan,66 and a plebiscite
was held in 1921 to determine the new German-Polish
frontier.67 A final border was negotiated between the two
countries, but the sovereignty of each within its portion of
Upper Silesia was restricted by a complex League of Nations
minority rights protection regime designed to ease the
transition to full state sovereignty over a 15 year period.68
Before it was finally resolved, the conflict in Upper Silesia
seems to have met all of the conditions of conflict for which
the ICRC was seeking Common Article 3 coverage. It
involved non-regular German and Polish forces, often
committing terrorist acts across international borders;
primarily Protestant Germans versus primarily Catholic
Poles, in an area in which the Germans had purposefully
sought to increase the numbers of German inhabitants;
German inhabitants who themselves occupied most positions
of authority and prestige in the area and owned most of the
more valuable economic infrastructure.69
In sum, prior to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, it can be
argued that the ICRC and the party-states were fully aware
both in practice and in negotiation that forms of transnational
armed conflict (and armed conflict resolution) existed that
were consistent with neither the final Common Article 2
64

Id. at 26. The ICRC description of the conflict as a ―civil war‖
does not really capture the transnational character of this conflict in terms
of support provided by Germany to the ethnic German forces and the lack
of effective Polish control over many parts of the area. See note 66, infra.
65
See GEORGES KAECKENBEECK, THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERIMENT
OF UPPER SILESIA: A STUDY IN THE WORKING OF THE UPPER SILESIAN
SETTLEMENT 1922-1937, at 25 (1942).
66
RICHARD M. WATT, BITTER GLORY, POLAND AND ITS FATE 19181939, at 153-60 (1998).
67
KAECKENBEECK, supra note 65, at 5-7.
68
Id. at 11-12, 25.
69
See WATT, supra note 66, at 153-60.
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definition of international armed conflict nor the Common
Article 3 definition of non-international armed conflict. The
view that there are other forms of transnational conflict
outside those covered by the 1949 conventions is bolstered by
the fact that in Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, the parties agreed to expand the armed conflicts
to which Common Article 2 would apply to ―include armed
conflicts in which people are fighting against colonial
domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in
the exercise of their right of self-determination.‖70 This was
not a legal decision -- it was a question of international
politics in creating new law, and practical recognition on the
part of the international community that such armed conflicts
were already occurring. Expanding the coverage of Common
Article 2 did not fuel an increase in the number of such
conflicts being fought, but it did create a legal regime which
encouraged more humane treatment for the combatants and
civilians involved in these conflicts. The current conflict
between the U.S. and its state actor allies against al Qaeda
and its affiliated groups has led certain writers to propose the
concept of ―transnational armed conflict,‖ that is, noninternational armed conflict not restricted to the borders of a
particular country, as a means to bring accepted customary
international humanitarian legal norms regarding the
treatment of individuals and the use of force to bear on all
parties involved.71
If a conflict can be classified as international armed
conflict, questions as to detainee status and what detention
review procedures should be used may be resolved easily in
many cases. For example, deciding whether a detainee should
receive prisoner of war status under Geneva Convention III is
70

International Committee of the Red Cross, International
Humanitarian Law – Treaties & Documents, Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, Part I,
Article 1, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebART/470750004?OpenDocument.
71
GEOFFREY S. CORN, VICTOR M. HANSEN, DICK JACKSON, ERIC
TALBOT JENSEN, MICHAEL W. LEWIS, JAMES A. SCHOETTLER, JR., THE
WAR ON TERROR AND THE LAWS OF WAR 1-36 (2009).
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often fairly easy to determine, using fairly simple procedures.
A status determination hearing is required only when there is
a question as to whether an individual is a prisoner of war.72
Historically, since those engaged in international armed
conflict were ordinarily fighting for a state actor while in
uniform and carrying military identification and because of
the treatment incentives attaching to prisoner of war status,
the need for such hearings in international armed conflicts
was expected to be the exception rather than the rule.73
Additionally, one would expect the error rate in making such
determinations to be low given the objective criteria against
which most detainees would be judged, such as the wearing
of a uniform or possession of military identification.74 Less
formal proceedings in this context have the added benefit of
not requiring classified information being made available to
the detainee, thereby reducing potential compromises to the
security and integrity of intelligence.75 Further, because
prisoners of war could be held until the conflict was finished,
there wasn‘t really a need for any sort of periodic review to
determine whether individuals should be released.
Implementation of an appropriate procedure to make
these determinations is a national matter, and varies to some
degree between different nations.76 If, for example, during the
course of an international or non-international armed conflict,
U.S. forces captured an individual who had engaged in a
belligerent act and there were a question as to whether the
person was a prisoner of war, the individual would be
initially treated as a prisoner of war and then afforded a status
72

Art. 5, Geneva Convention III, supra note 55.
Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 47, at 1088-89.
74
Id. at 1088. During the First Gulf War, U.S. forces held 1,196 art.
5, Geneva Convention III, hearings for individuals whose prisoner of war
status was uncertain. Of these, 886 individuals were found not be eligible
for prisoner of war status. FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, CONDUCT OF THE
PERSIAN GULF WAR, at 578 (Apr. 1992), available at
http://www.ndu.edu/library/epubs/cpgw.pdf. When factored into the
approximately 64,000 Iraqi prisoners of war taken by the coalition forces,
the error rate in detaining civilians as prisoners of war was about .01
percent. Id. at 294.
75
Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 47, at 1088-89.
76
Id. at 1091.
73
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determination hearing before a tribunal as required by article
5, Geneva Convention III, (held in accordance with AR 1908, a joint military regulation governing status determination
procedures).77 The expected minimum standard of treatment
is specified in the regulation: all detainees receive humane
treatment; no detainee shall suffer ―murder, torture, corporal
punishment, mutilation, [being made a hostage], sensory
deprivation, collective punishments, execution without trial
by proper authority, [or any] cruel and degrading
treatment.‖78 Further, all detainees are to ―be respected as
human beings. They will be protected against all acts of
violence to include rape, forced prostitution, assault and theft,
insults, public curiosity, bodily injury, and reprisals of any
kind.‖79 The detainee‘s case would be heard by a three
member tribunal composed of three commissioned officers, at
least one of whom is in the rank of major or above.80 The
senior officer serves as the president of the tribunal, and a
military attorney is ordinarily appointed as the recorder.81
The procedures afford detainees significant process
rights. A written record is made of the proceedings, the
proceedings are open unless security would be compromised,
and detainees are advised of their rights beforehand,
including the right to an interpreter.82 Detainees may attend
all open sessions, call reasonably available witnesses,
question witnesses, submit documentary evidence, address
the tribunal, or chose to remain silent.83 Once the tribunal
votes on the case, using a standard of preponderance of the
evidence, its determination is forwarded to the primary legal
advisor of the officer exercising general court-martial
77

ARMY REGULATION 190-8, MILITARY POLICE – ENEMY PRISONERS
OF WAR, RETAINED PERSONNEL, CIVILIAN INTERNEES AND OTHER
DETAINEES, Headquarters, Departments of the Army, the Navy, the Air
Force, and the Marine Corps, Oct. 1, 1997, at ¶ 1-6a, b [hereinafter ―AR
190-8‖]. The regulation is joint and therefore applicable to all of the
services.
78
Id. at ¶ 1-5b.
79
Id. at ¶ 1-5c.
80
Id. at ¶ 1-6c.
81
Id.
82
Id. at ¶ 1-6e(2)-(5).
83
AR 190-8, supra note 77, at ¶ 1-6e(6)-(10).
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convening authority, so that the record can be reviewed for
legal sufficiency if prisoner of war status is not granted.84 If
determined to be a prisoner of war, and therefore under
Common Article 2, Geneva Convention III, the individual
could be held until the international armed conflict had
finished.85 If not found to be a prisoner of war, but instead a
civilian who should be interned for reasons of operational
security, the person will be detained by U.S. forces under
Geneva Convention IV, and afforded Common Article 3
treatment.86 The individual could be held only as long as
necessary, that is, for as long as the individual posed a threat
to the U.S. forces.87 Otherwise, the individual would be
released or transferred to a domestic authority. Innocent
civilians are to be returned to their homes immediately.88 In
dealing with members of transnational armed groups like al
Qaeda, however, even a prisoner of war determination is
potentially controversial, because nations such as the U.S.
which have not ratified Additional Protocol I to the 1949
Geneva Conventions may be more likely to apply the stricter
standard under Geneva Convention III to determine whether
an individual is entitled to prisoner of war status.89
For detainees held in non-international armed conflicts,
Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions sets the
baseline for physical treatment but does not specify how
detainee status should be determined or reviewed. As a
84

Id. at ¶ 1-6f, g. A General Court-Martial Convening Authority is
an individual authorized by Art. 22a, Uniform Code of Military Justice,
10 U.S.C. §822a (2008), to convene a general court-martial. These
individuals include the President, the Secretary of Defense, commanders
of divisions or separate brigades, and ―any other commanding officer in
any of the armed forces when empowered by the President.‖ Id.
85
Id. at ¶ 1-6e(10)(a).
86
Id. at ¶ 1-6e(10)(d).
87
Accordingly, a periodic review is required in the context of the
foreign force acting as an occupying power. Art. 78, Geneva Convention
IV, supra note 55.
88
AR 190-8, supra note 77, at ¶ 1-6e(10)(c).
89
See Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 47, at 1093-94 n.70
(explaining the different standards under Geneva Convention IV and
Additional Protocol I, and the U.S. position on the applicable standard);
see also FM 34-22, supra note 20, at 1-10.
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matter of implementing U.S. policy, the decision to apply AR
190-890 to all detainees regardless of the nature of the conflict
provides for an expansion in the humanitarian treatment
afforded by Common Article 3. Practically, this is consistent
with the aim of the theory of transnational armed conflict, but
some might argue that this expands the scope of armed
conflict beyond what international humanitarian treaty law,
and possibly customary law, allows.91 Accordingly, some
might argue that the process afforded under AR 190-8,
although greater than that expected under international law in
cases of international armed conflict, is not sufficient from an
international human rights law perspective for the detention
of individuals who are believed to be a part of al Qaeda.
The fight against al Qaeda and its affiliates has gone on
since September 2001 and shows no sign of ending soon.92
Arguments for detaining individuals who are part of or who
provide support to such organizations for extended periods of
time find strong justification in the number of released
Guantanamo detainees who have made their way back to the
battlefield.93 The Bush Administration‘s decision to create
the detention facility at Guantanamo to hold individuals
believed to be part of or to have supported al Qaeda in its
attacks against the U.S. was based in large part on the
assessment that non-U.S. national detainees would not have
access to U.S. courts to challenge their continued detention or
potential trials before military commissions, because rights
under the U.S. Constitution would not extend to them on the
territory of a foreign state.94 In 2004, the U.S. Supreme
90

AR 190-8, supra note 77.
See Rona, supra note 59, at 57-63.
92
See Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 47, at 1100.
93
See Amanda Scott, Pentagon: More Former Guantanamo
Detainees Returning to Battlefield, VOANEWS, Jan. 14, 2009, available at
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-01-14-voa1268809502.html. Many released detainees have not returned to the
battlefield. See Gavin Lee, Guantanamo Guards Reunited with ExInmates, BBC NEWS MAG., Jan. 12, 2010, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8452937.stm.
94
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 828 (2008) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (quoting a memorandum written by Deputy Assistant
Attorneys General Patrick F. Philbin and John C. Yoo which indicated
91
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Court found otherwise in Rasul v. Bush, in which it held that
because the habeas corpus statute did not distinguish between
U.S. citizens and non-citizens, and because of the special
degree of control exercised by the U.S. over Guantanamo,
federal courts had jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions from
non-citizen Guantanamo detainees.95 This right, albeit on
constitutional grounds, was later reaffirmed in Boumediene,
which cleared the path for Guantanamo detainees to
challenge their detention in federal courts using the right of
habeas corpus, despite statutory amendments to the contrary
in the Military Commission Act (MCA).96
IV. BOUMEDIENE V. BUSH
Mr. Lakhdar Boumediene, a native of Algeria,
immigrated to Bosnia during the time of the Wars of
Yugoslavian Succession. In the fall of 2001, on suspicion that
he and five other former Algerian nationals were plotting to
bomb the U.S. and British embassies in Sarajevo, the six
were detained and investigated by Bosnian law enforcement
and judicial authorities. They were released for lack of
evidence, but subsequently detained by U.S. personnel and
brought to Guantanamo Naval Station.97 After a complex
appellate history involving the six men‘s petitions for writs of
habeas corpus, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in
2007 after it had originally denied review only three months
earlier.98 There were four primary issues before the court:

Guantanamo Naval Station was outside U.S. federal court jurisdiction);
see also CBSNews.com, Obama Upends Bush, Will Close Guantanamo,
Jan. 22, 2009,
http://cbsnews.com/stories/2009/01/22/politics/100days/main4746421.sht
ml (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
95
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480 (2004).
96
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771.
97
Lakhdar Boumediene – The Guantanamo Docket,
NYTIMES.COM, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/10005lakhdar-boumediene/documents/2/pages/661#4.
98
See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 733-34.
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1. Did the MCA‘s99 amendment of 28 U.S.C.
§2241 to remove habeas corpus jurisdiction
from the federal courts for detainee cases like
Boumediene‘s actually effect this change in
the statute?100
2. If the MCA did effect this change, was it in
conformance with the Suspension Clause of
the Constitution?101
3. If this change was unconstitutional, did the
Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT)
procedures set out in the DTA102 provide an
otherwise adequate substitute for habeas
corpus proceedings?103
4. If these procedures were inadequate, could
Boumediene and his fellow petitioners
challenge these procedures without having
first gone through them? 104
The Court found that the language of §7 of the MCA
amended the statutory right of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§2241 to prevent the hearing of even pending habeas corpus
petitions from detainees held at Guantanamo, and that this
was confirmed by the legislative history.105 This amendment,
however, was unconstitutional. In reviewing the history of
Guantanamo, the Court found that the base was a remnant of
the U.S. occupation of Cuba after the Spanish-American War
in 1898.106 Through a lease executed between the U.S. and
the newly independent Cuba in 1903, the U.S. disclaimed
formal sovereignty over the base, but was allowed to exercise

99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106

28 U.S.C.A. § 2241(e) (Supp. 2007).
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 735-39 (2008).
Id. at 739-40.
DTA, supra note 22, at §§ 1001–1006.
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 770-73.
Id. at 768.
Id. at 736, 760.
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 752-53 (2008).
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―complete jurisdiction and control.‖107 In 1934, the two
countries entered into a treaty which effectively gave Cuba
―no rights as a sovereign until the parties agree to
modification of the 1903 Lease Agreement or the United
States abandons the base.‖108 In keeping with the holding in
Eisentrager v. Johnson,109 a detainee case from post-World
War II Occupation Germany, the Court looked to the
objective degree of control exercised by the U.S. over the
naval station, and found that the U.S. ―continued to maintain
the same plenary control it had enjoyed since 1898.‖110 In the
Court‘s view, therefore, ―Guantanamo Bay . . . is no transient
possession. In every practical sense, Guantanamo is not
abroad; it is within the constant jurisdiction of the United
States.‖111 Looking again to Eisentrager to help analyze a
situation in which non-citizens are claiming the right of
habeas corpus and the U.S. did not have de jure sovereignty
over the detention site, the Court found that
at least three factors are relevant in
determining the reach of the Suspension
Clause: (1) The citizenship and status of the
detainee and the adequacy of the process
through which that status determination was
made; (2) the nature of the sites where
apprehension and then detention took place;
and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in
resolving the prisoner‘s entitlement to the
writ.112
Unlike the petitioners in Eisentrager, Boumediene and his
fellow petitioners contested their status, which had not been
determined through the rigorous adversarial proceedings
107

Id. at 745-46 (citing Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval
Stations, art III, U.S.-Cuba, Feb. 23, 1903, T.S. No. 418).
108
Id. at 746 (citing Treaty Defining Relations with Cuba, art III,
May 29, 1934, 48 Stat. 1683, T.S. No. 866).
109
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 769-79 (1950); see also
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 762-64 (2008).
110
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 752.
111
Id. at 755.
112
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 753 (2008).
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affording significant due process.113 The Court noted that
―the procedural protections afforded the detainees in the
CSRT hearings [were] far more limited, and we conclude, fall
well short of the procedures and adversarial mechanisms that
would eliminate the need for habeas corpus review.‖114
Interestingly, the adequacy of the status determination
process was also used later in the Court‘s analysis once it had
found that the Suspension Clause applied to Guantanamo,115
but at that point adequacy was addressed to determine
whether the CSRT process including the review of its
findings by the Circuit Court provided an adequate substitute
for habeas corpus proceedings.116 At this initial stage of the
Court‘s analysis, however, the analytical function of
evaluating process adequacy was geared toward determining
whether the existing processes obviated the need for habeas
corpus review.117 As to the nature of the detention site, the
Court found Guantanamo was very different from Occupation
Germany.118 The U.S. shared control of Occupation Germany
with the other Allies, with the intent to return it to civilian
German control; its control was ―neither absolute nor
indefinite,‖ as compared to U.S. control of Guantanamo.119
Further, the Court found no significant negative impacts in
allowing the Guantanamo petitioners the writ. Unlike
Occupation Germany, with the continuing threat of irregular
enemy military action and the need for massive
reconstruction and aid, the Court noted that
[t]he United States Naval Station at
Guantanamo Bay consists of 45 square miles
of land and water. The base has been used, at
113

Id.
Id. at 754 (the CSRT process potentially provided less process
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various points, to house migrants and refugees
temporarily. At present, other than the
detainees themselves, the only long-term
residents are American military personnel,
their families, and a small number of workers.
[citation omitted]. The detainees have been
deemed enemies of the United States. At
present, dangerous as they may be if released,
they are contained in a secure prison facility
located on an isolated and heavily fortified
military base.120
Finally, the Court noted that there was ―no indication . . .
that adjudicating a habeas corpus petition would cause
friction with the host government.‖121 Cuban courts were
without jurisdiction over the U.S. military personnel or the
detainees, and the U.S. was not accountable to another
―sovereign for its acts on the base‖ so long as it met the terms
of the lease.122 The Court noted that ―[w]ere that not the case,
or if the detention facility were located in an active theater of
war, arguments that issuing the writ would be ‗impracticable
or anomalous‘ would have more weight.‖123
The
constitutional right to habeas corpus was therefore available
to those detained at Guantanamo unless appropriately
suspended – something the MCA ―[did] not purport‖ to
effect.124
The Court then turned to the issue of whether the DTA
provided an adequate substitute for habeas corpus procedures.
Without deciding the merits of petitioners‘ argument that the
CSRT mechanism was deficient in providing sufficient due
process under the DTA, the Court found that the limitations
placed upon the Circuit Court of Appeal‘s review of CSRT
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Id. at 755.
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Id. at 755-57.
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Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 756 (2008).
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determinations rendered such reviews inadequate.125 In
particular, the Court noted
[f]or the writ of habeas corpus, or its
substitute, to function as an effective and
proper remedy in this context, the court that
conducts the habeas proceeding must have the
means to correct errors that occurred during
the CSRT proceedings. This includes some
authority to assess the sufficiency of the
Government‘s evidence against the detainee. It
also must have the authority to admit and
consider relevant exculpatory evidence that
was not introduced during the earlier
proceeding. . . . Here that opportunity is
constitutionally required.126
Because the DTA limited the Court of Appeals‘ review to
determining whether the CSRT complied with the ―standards
and procedures specified by the Secretary of Defense...‖127
and the legislative history showed that this limited degree of
judicial review was precisely what the Congress intended, the
Court found this standard of error correction authority had
not been met.128 Further, because of the circumstances of the
case, including the length of time that the petitioners had
already spent in detention, the Court found that they need not
challenge these procedures in the D.C. Circuit Court before
pursuing their habeas corpus actions in the District Court.129
Accordingly, the decision of the D.C. Circuit Court was
reversed and remanded. Since the Court‘s decision,
Guantanamo detainees have in general been very successful
in their habeas corpus litigation, in large part because the
government has been unable to show by a preponderance of
the evidence that they were part of al Qaeda or associated

125
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groups.130 This includes Boumediene, who at present has
found a home in France, where he has been joined by his
family.131 Likely encouraged by these results, detainees at the
Parwan Detention Facility are seeking to use habeas corpus
proceedings to challenge their detention in Afghanistan,
arguing that the Parwan Detention Facility is equivalent to
Guantanamo under the holding in Boumediene.132
V. AL MAQALEH V. GATES, DISTRICT COURT OPINION
In 2009, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia applied the Boumediene analysis to habeas corpus
petitions brought by four detainees now presumably at the
Parwan Detention Facility. Each detainee was a foreign
national apparently captured outside Afghanistan and brought
to the BTIF, where they had been held for at least six years at
the time of the court‘s hearing of the case.133 Two of the
130

Del Quentin Wilber, 2008 habeas ruling may pose snag as U.S.
weighs indefinite Guantanamo detentions, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2010, at
A2, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/02/12?AR2010021204911.html?hpid=moreheadl
ines. For example, in its decision in Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d
63 (D.D.C. 2009), the D.C. District Court rejected ―substantial support‖
or ―direct support‖ of al Qaeda or the Taliban as proper bases for
continued detention, although the court found evidence of this could be
relevant to determining whether an individual belonged to those
organizations or directly participated in hostilities. Id. at 70.
Interestingly, the government position before the district court on
authority to detain was that the rules applicable to international armed
conflict should apply by analog. Id. at 67. The district court noted that
the AUMF as interpreted in caselaw includes the power to detain, and that
this was ―consistent with the law of war principles governing noninternational conflicts.‖ Id. at 70. Arguably, the district court implicitly
recognizes the concept of transnational armed conflict as an analytical
tool to help it find the rules that should apply in what is strictly neither an
international nor a non-international armed conflict.
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France accepts Boumediene in action to expedite closure of
Guantanamo,
http://www.wilmerhale.com/about/news/newsDetail.aspx?news=1586
(last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
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Joint Brief for the Petitioners-Appellees, at 26-31, Al Maqaleh v.
Gates, No. 09-5265, 2010 WL 2010783 (C.A.D.C. 2010).
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Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 207 (D.D.C. 2009).
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detainees, including Mr. al Maqaleh, claimed to be Yemeni,
one claimed he was Tunisian, and one claimed to be an
Afghan.134 The district court first noted that Boumediene had
invalidated the MCA‘s elimination of habeas corpus
jurisdiction for petitions by detainees only with regard to
Guantanamo.135 Accordingly, the issue for the court was
―whether the statute withdrawing habeas corpus jurisdiction
is constitutional as applied to the[ ] detainees held at
Bagram,‖ given the degree of U.S. control over the airfield
(essentially the same issue that confronted the Court in
Boumediene).136 For purposes of analysis, the district court
separated the three factors that the U.S. Supreme Court had
looked at in evaluating whether the Suspension Clause was
applicable to Guantanamo into six factors: detainee
citizenship, detainee status, nature of the apprehension site,
nature of the detention site, adequacy of the status
determination process and ―practical obstacles inherent in
resolving the petitioner‘s entitlement to the writ.‖137 It then
added a seventh factor to be considered in evaluating the
others: the reasonableness of ―the length of a petitioner‘s
detention without adequate review.‖138 As to the first three
factors, the district court found that the Parwan Detention
Facility petitioners were the same as the Guantanamo
petitioners.139 None were U.S. citizens, all had been
determined to be enemy combatants, and all had been
apprehended outside the U.S.140 The district court found that
the U.S. Supreme Court had not really analyzed these factors
to any great depth in Boumediene, and therefore found only
the issue of the apprehension site to be important. Unlike the
situation in Guantanamo, where all the detainees had been
apprehended outside the base but then brought there, the
Parwan Detention Facility contained both detainees like the
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petitioners and individuals taken in Afghanistan itself. The
district court found this weighed in the petitioners‘ favor.141
A Site of Detention
The district court then focused on the three remaining,
and in its opinion, dispositive factors. Regarding the nature of
the detention site, the district court examined the legal status
of the U.S. presence in Afghanistan, and found that the nature
of U.S. control at Bagram was essentially the same as at
Guantanamo – that is, ―near-total operational control.‖142 The
district court based this finding on the terms of the lease for
Bagram, which provided the U.S. with exclusive use during
its occupancy, as well as assignment and reversion authority,
and on the freedom from Afghan control afforded by the
exchange of diplomatic notes defining the status of U.S.
forces in Afghanistan.143 Although the district court noted
that U.S. control over Bagram was less plenary than that
found at Guantanamo,144 and that Bagram could not be
considered ―not abroad,‖145 it found the freedom of
movement and the immunity from host nation criminal
jurisdiction manifested the very high ―objective degree of
control‖ enjoyed by the U.S. at Bagram, in the district court‘s
words, ―practically absolute.‖146 This factor, in the district
141
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Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 223 (D.D.C. 2009).
Often, the district court focuses on the degree of control exercised at the
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over the airfield as a whole. See, e.g., id. at 223-24. In Boumediene, the
U.S. Supreme Court did not focus on the control exercised at the
Guantanamo detention facility in assessing whether U.S. control was of a
degree to make it part of U.S. territory – rather the court looked to the
installation as a whole. See note 115, supra. It is illogical to suggest that a
nation responsible for running a detention facility in active theater of
combat would accept anything less than total operational control for
security and safety purposes – but that does not necessarily make it part of
the United States for purposes of the Suspension Clause. Further, the
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court‘s view, did ―not weigh strongly against extension‖ of
the Suspension Clause147
This finding appears to be based on two mistaken
premises. First, the district court appears to have confused
operational control, which may be quite extensive but is
ordinarily temporary and mission-related, with objective
control in a continuing de facto sovereign sense. The status
of forces arrangement grants a limited waiver of Afghan
authority over OEF forces for mission purposes, as these
agreements typically do. This waiver is based on the AfghanU.S. alliance, and although it gives great latitude to OEF
forces conducting their missions, it does not for example
waive continuing Afghan jurisdiction over local workers or
even U.S. contractors at the airfield.148 Further, the U.S.
occupancy of Bagram is not intended to be permanent,149 and
at time of the district court‘s decision had existed for less
than a decade. A status of forces arrangement between two
countries is a very real manifestation of the host nation‘s
sovereignty, and the mission focus of the limited waiver of
jurisdiction. Given the ongoing conflict with al Qaeda and the
Taliban, the latitude afforded OEF forces is necessarily
greater for example than that accorded to NATO allies who
maintain military establishments within the U.S. under the

district court appears to have misread the factual record when it states that
―it is the United States, not U.S. allies, that detains people at the Bagram
Theater Internment Facility and that operates (and hence fully controls)
that prison facility and its occupants, which was not the case at
Landsberg.‖ Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 224. Landsberg Prison was
designated as War Criminal Prison No. 1 by the U.S. Army commander in
Germany in 1946, it housed individuals convicted by various U.S.
tribunals, and it was operated by the U.S. until it was returned to German
control in 1958. See also Case Closed, TIME, June 18, 1951, (execution
of SS officers convicted by U.S. tribunals at the direction of Landsberg‘s
U.S. commandant) available at
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,814963.html (last visited Mar.
23, 2010).
147
Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 231.
148
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Id. at 224-25; see Brief for Respondent-Appellants at 18-21, Al
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NATO Status of Forces Agreement,150 but very similar in
many of the covered subject areas, such as taxation,
importation of equipment, and the leasing of host nation
facilities..151
This confusion is also shown by the district court‘s
rejection of the government‘s argument that extending the
reach of the Suspension Clause to Bagram was tantamount to
holding that the Constitution applied world-wide,152 despite
having earlier noted the government‘s argument that the
degree of control exercised by the U.S. over Bagram was
consistent with that found at any overseas U.S. base.153
According to the district court, in keeping with Boumediene,
―[t]he Suspension Clause only applies where the United
States has the degree of control over a site that would permit
meaningful review of an individual‘s detention following a
‗reasonable amount of time.‘‖154 Not only does the language
in Boumediene not support such a standard, but given the
world-wide dispersal of U.S. bases overseas, this standard in
effect realizes the government‘s concern regarding the
breadth of the Suspension Clause‘s potential application
under such a holding. The second mistaken premise appears
to be the district court‘s determination that setting out a
spectrum of control using the conditions at Guantanamo and
150

Compare Diplomatic Note 202, ¶2, supra note 27 (―The Embassy
proposes, without prejudice to the conduct of ongoing military operations
by the United States, that such personnel be accorded a status equivalent
to that‖ given to the embassy‘s administrative and technical staff under
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations), with Agreement
Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of
Their Forces, London, June 19, 1951 (hereinafter ―NATO SOFA‖), art.
VIIb (―The authorities of the receiving state will have jurisdiction over the
members of a force or civilian component and their dependents with
respect to offences committed within the territory of the receiving State
and punishable by the law of that State.‖).
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Compare Diplomatic Note 202, ¶¶ 2-6, 7-8, supra note 27, with
NATO SOFA, arts. III-VI, IIX-XIV, supra note 150.
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Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 231 (D.D.C. 2009).
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―near-total operational control,‖ which would ordinarily apply to any U.S.
overseas base, with the very special degree of practically sovereign
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the Landsberg Prison in Occupied Germany in which the
Eisentrager petitioners were held as its terminus points was
useful in evaluating conditions at Bagram. In sum, the district
court found the control exercised by the U.S. at the Parwan
Detention Facility to be much more like that at Guantanamo
than in Germany.155 The question that should have been
addressed is not where the Parwan Detention Facility falls on
such a spectrum, but whether the degree of control exercised
by the U.S. is such that the Parwan Detention Facility
essentially becomes U.S. territory to which the Suspension
Clause would apply.
B. Adequacy of Process
The district court noted a number of features of the
Bagram status review process that made it less rigorous than
even the Guantanamo CSRT process found insufficient by the
Supreme Court, and found it therefore inadequate.156 These
deficiencies included ‗no recourse to a neutral decisionmaker‖ on status determinations; no access to even a personal
representative before the hearing board for the petitioners;
only an opportunity to submit a written statement to the board
rather than to speak; no right for the petitioners to see the
evidence which inculpated them; and uncertain evidentiary
standards.157 The district court found this factor ―strongly
favors petitioners‘ claim for habeas protection.‖158 The
district court rejected the government‘s argument that
adequacy of the status determination process was only
relevant once it was determined that the degree of U.S.
155

Id. at 224.
Id. at 227.
157
Id. at 226-27. Under the Enemy Combatant Review Board
process, status reviews were ordinarily conducted within 75 days of
capture and every six months thereafter. The Board was composed of five
commissioned officers who evaluated each case and made a majority vote
recommendation to the general court-martial convening authority.
Decisions were ―based on information derived from a variety of sources,
including classified intelligence and testimony from individuals involved
in the capture and interrogation of the detainee.‖ Gray Declaration, supra
note 18, at 4-5.
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156

68

Trends and Issues in Terrorism and the Law

Vol.5

control over the detention site was so great that it became
U.S. territory to which the Suspension Clause would apply.159
The district noted that the Boumediene opinion specifically
―enumerated ‗adequacy of the process‘ as one of the factors
that determine whether the Suspension Clause applies.‖160
Although the district court was correct that status
determination process adequacy was a specific factor
considered by the Boumediene Court in assessing whether the
Suspension Clause should apply, it would appear that the
district court erred in appreciating the limited function that
analysis of this factor had in the initial part of the
Boumediene analysis. The Boumediene Court looked at it first
only to see whether there was no need for habeas corpus
review, not to determine whether in fact the Suspension
Clause should apply.161 That deeper analysis of the
sufficiency of the process occurred only after the special
nature of the U.S. jurisdiction over Guantanamo had been
established.162
C. Practical Obstacles
With regard to the practical obstacles that would militate
against extending the Suspension Clause to the Parwan
Detention Facility, the district court noted that Bagram was in
an active war zone and often the subject of insurgent
attack.163 However, the high degree of control exercised by
the U.S. over the base meant that it would be able to conduct
rigorous status determination procedures as it had
traditionally done in areas of operations, and that modern
video teleconferencing capabilities reduced the need for
moving detainees to habeas corpus hearings.164 Further, the
159
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161
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extra burden of dealing with the logistical challenges would
fall primarily upon the ―lawyers and administrative personnel
involved, not on those who would otherwise be on the
battlefield.‖ 165 Any witnesses, for example, would have
information dating back six years to the time of the
petitioners‘ apprehensions, and therefore would not involve
personnel currently involved in operations.166 Further,
potential friction between the U.S. and the host government
would be avoided by not affording the one Afghan petitioner,
Wazir, the ability to contest his detention through a habeas
corpus proceeding.167 The district court also noted the length
of time which the petitioners had been held, and that if the
Government was ―truly concerned about the logistical
obstacles and burdens associated with affording habeas
review to these few petitioners at Bagram, transfer to a nonbattlefield location remains an option.‖168
The district court appears to underestimate the logistical
difficulties that would flow from holding habeas corpus
hearings in a war zone. Even if lawyers and administrative
personnel are primarily the ones directly involved in such
hearings, and the number of potential petitioners is small
because the holding in al Maqaleh only applies to nonAfghan nationals apprehended outside Afghanistan, these
additional personnel will require logistical and life support,
and additional security. Setting up lengthy video
teleconferences impacts bandwidth required for actual
combat operations. Further, potential petitioners would have
little to lose were they to falsely claim that they had been
apprehended outside Afghanistan – under al Maqaleh they
would appear to at least get a habeas hearing. The district
court‘s decision also appears to unrealistically downplay the
possibility of friction between the U.S. and Afghanistan
regarding the use of a U.S. civilian judicial hearing
concerning detainees of mutual security concern. The flow of
foreign fighters into Afghanistan from across the Muslim
165
166
167
168
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world is well documented,169 as is the attendant flow of
financial and materiel resources to al Qaeda and the Taliban
insurgents.170 The foreign fighters in particular are viewed as
particularly brutal in their tactics against Afghan civilians, a
perception which is quite telling given the demonstrated
disregard for civilian casualties by the Taliban.171 Regardless
of their nationalities and sites of apprehension, Afghanistan
could in fact have a pronounced security interest in the
Bagram petitioners, as well as a perception of Afghan
sovereignty being disrespected through the use of habeas
corpus hearings involving petitioners detained in
Afghanistan.172
D. District Court‘s Conclusion
After evaluating and balancing all of these factors, the
district court found ―that the Bagram detainees in these cases
are virtually identical to the Guantanamo detainees in
Boumediene, and the circumstances of their detention are
quite similar as well.‖173 The district court included its
seventh factor, the length of time the detainees had been held
without an adequate detention status hearing, in its
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analysis.174 The district court noted that in keeping with ―the
kind of practical, functional analysis the Supreme Court has
mandated in Boumediene,‖ if potential friction with
Afghanistan were too great, or the government decided to
―provide greater process in determining the status of the
detainees, the balance of factors could shift against extension
of the Suspension Clause.‖175 The existing status
determination procedures, however, gave less process than
even that afforded to Guantanamo detainees, and therefore
were not an adequate substitute for habeas corpus
proceedings. In view of its balancing of the Boumediene
factors, the district court held ―that the Suspension Clause
extends to three of the four petitioners at Bagram,‖ and the
MCA‘s elimination of habeas corpus jurisdiction in their
cases was unconstitutional.176
E. Assessment of the District Court‘s Holding
Although the district court used the factors set out in
Boumediene to determine whether the Suspension Clause
reached the Parwan Detention Facility, its methodology in
assessing these factors appears inconsistent with that used by
the U.S. Supreme Court. First, although the district court
properly assessed the first three factors in the Boumediene
analysis to not be of great significance, it did appear to
substantially value these factors in its determination that the
Guantanamo detainees and the Parwan Detention Facility
detainees were practically identical. This high degree of
identity appears to have been important in the district court‘s
decision to allow the extension of the Suspension Clause to
the non-Afghan petitioners. Second, the district court appears
to have improperly weighted the adequacy-of-process factor
in the threshold determination as to whether the Suspension
Clause applied in this case. Third, the district court did not
assess the nature of the detention site properly. The
Boumediene opinion relied upon the Eisentrager example of
Landsberg Prison in an illustrative fashion, not as a definitive
174
175
176
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terminus on a spectrum against which to compare detention
sites. In having done so, the district court misread the
importance the U.S. Supreme Court placed on the very
special nature of de facto sovereign control maintained by the
U.S. over Guantanamo in finding that the Suspension Clause
extended there. Fourth, the district court appears to have
glossed over the significance of the practical obstacles in
holding habeas corpus hearings for detainees located in a war
zone, both in terms of the logistical burdens on the deployed
units who are already strained to provide adequate life
support services for personnel and fight Al Qaeda at the same
time, and the potential friction between the U.S. and
Afghanistan that could result from granting even non-Afghan
detainees the right to present habeas corpus petitions to U.S.
civilian courts. For these reasons, the district court‘s decision
should be overturned on appeal.177
Obscured in part perhaps through its inclusion as an
evaluation factor among several, the U.S. Supreme Court‘s
concern that individuals could be detained by executive order
indefinitely without the benefit of an impartial hearing to
determine their status should not be overlooked. Extending
habeas protection to just a small class of detainees within the
larger detainee population at the Parwan Detention Facility
on the basis of non-Afghan nationality, while allowing those
who are of Afghan nationality to be subject to indefinite
detention would not seem to meet this concern.178 As
177

See Brief for Respondent, supra note 149, at 30-52. In its brief to
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, the U.S. noted that an additional factor
that weighed against extending habeas corpus to detainees at the Parwan
Detention Facility was the potential for invocation of federal courts‘
habeas corpus jurisdiction simply by falsely claiming that they had been
captured outside of Afghanistan. Id. at 21-22.
178
The district court noted that although ―such a result would be
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locations to avoid application of the Suspension Clause. Al Maqaleh, 604
F. Supp. 2d at 216. It is arguably within the government‘s discretion in
combat operations abroad to determine where it will hold detainees. See
Munaf v. Geren, 128 S.Ct. 2207, 2218 (2008); whether particular
constitutional rights accrue to such detainees is a separate question.
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Boumediene suggests through its weighing of the adequacyof- process factor, and as the district court noted in its
conclusion in al Maqaleh, the executive has both the ability
and the flexibility to devise a process which meets the
Court‘s concerns as to the substance of what is required
process-wise to detain individuals in the current, transnational
armed conflict. Perhaps acting on these implicit invitations,
the Obama Administration has recently put into effect a
revised status determination process for detainees held at the
Parwan Detention Facility.179
VI.

AL MAQALEH V. GATES, CIRCUIT COURT OPINION

The D.C. Circuit Court began its analysis by reviewing
the legislative and litigative history of the issue of habeas
corpus for detainees held as a result of the conflict with al
Qaeda and its affiliates up to the U.S. Supreme Court‘s
decision in Boumediene.180 Rather than apply the six or
seven factors that the district court had used in its analysis,
the circuit court instead focused on the three factors stated by
the U.S. Supreme Court: detainee citizenship and status, and
the adequacy of the process by which status was determined;
nature of the apprehension and detention sites; and what
practical obstacles complicated the resolution of whether the
detainee was entitled to the writ.181 Before applying
Boumediene to the petitioners‘ case, however, the circuit
court first disposed of what it viewed as the untenable
extreme positions advocated by each party as to whether
jurisdiction existed. As to the government‘s position that
Boumediene only applied to areas of de facto sovereignty
such as Guantanamo, the circuit court noted that the U.S.
Supreme Court had not decided Eisentrager solely on the
basis of sovereignty, but also upon the practicalities of the
situation in Occupied Germany – a method of analysis
continued in Boumediene.182 Further, the U.S. Supreme Court
179
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in Boumediene had ―rejected the Government‘s reading of
Eisentrager because the meaning of the word ‗sovereignty‘ in
the Eisentrager opinion was not limited to the ‗narrow
technical sense‘ of the word and could be read ‗to connote the
degree of control the military asserted over the facility.‘‖183
Finally in Boumediene, the U.S. Supreme Court had
concluded that such a limited interpretation of Eisentrager
would be inconsistent with the ―functional approach to
questions of territoriality‖ it had taken in cases both before
and after Eisentrager.184 The D.C. Circuit Court likewise
rejected petitioners‘ argument that leasing a military base
would be ―sufficient to trigger the extraterritorial application
of the Suspension Clause‖ or at least the apprehension and
detention situs factor.185 The circuit court noted that counsel
for the petitioners had been unable at oral argument to
distinguish Bagram Airfield from other military installations
in this regard, and that adopting this position would
potentially extend the Suspension Clause not just to military
facilities but other Government leased facilities around the
world as well.186
In applying the first Boumediene factor, the circuit court
found that as to citizenship, status, and status determination,
the petitioners were no different than the detainees at
Guantanamo – that is, they had been labeled as enemy aliens
through a process that afforded even less process than the
inadequate Guantanamo status determination procedures
had.187 This factor therefore weighed in petitioners‘ favor.188
As to the second factor, the nature of the detention situs, the
circuit court found the degree of de facto U.S. control over
Bagram Airfield to be much less than that which exists over
Guantanamo, given the U.S. relationship with Afghanistan
and the lack of intent to make permanent use of the
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airfield.189 Although not determinative in the circuit court‘s
view, this factor weighed in favor of the Government.190 The
third and final Boumediene factor, ―the practical obstacles
inherent in resolving the prisoner‘s entitlement to the writ,‖
also weighed in the Government‘s favor. The circuit court
noted that unlike Occupied Germany in Eisentrager,
Afghanistan was an active combat theater, and therefore ―all
of the attributes of a facility exposed to the vagaries of war
are present in Bagram.‖191 The circuit court also found that
conducting habeas hearings for Bagram detainees would have
significant negative operational impacts,192 and could also
tend to aggravate relations with Afghanistan.193 Weighing all
three factors, and especially the third factor,194 the circuit
court concluded that ―the writ does not extend to the Bagram
confinement in an active theater of war in a territory under
neither the de facto nor de jure sovereignty of the United
States and within the territory of another de jure
sovereign.‖195
Although the circuit court‘s application of the
Boumediene factors appears less complex than the district
court‘s approach, in essence the district court focused on the
same points as being important: adequacy of status
determination, nature of detention situs, and practical
obstacles to holding habeas hearings. The circuit court‘s
approach in applying the factors takes a more holistic
approach to the facts, however, and is more in keeping with
the functional approach set out by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Eisentrager and Boumediene. For example, where the district
court looked only to the degree of operational control the
U.S. exercises over Bagram Airfield to determine that it was
basically the same as Guantanamo, the circuit court looked at
the broader picture of the relationship between the U.S. and
189
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Afghanistan to determine the situations were actually quite
different. Further, whereas the district court evaluated
obstacles from the narrow perspective of actually conducting
habeas hearings themselves, the circuit court looked to the
significant negative operational impact of such hearings and
their potential for damage to the alliance between the U.S.
and Afghanistan.
Certain aspects of the opinion are troubling, however.
First, the circuit court, like the district court, does not appear
to appreciate the threshold role played in the initial part of the
Boumediene analysis by the adequacy of the status
determination process. Second, its emphasis on the third
factor, the practical obstacles, in effect makes it the most
significant of the three in conducting the Boumediene
analysis. This would seem to be a question of typical
common-law justiciability, rather than one of constitutional
justiciability or jurisdiction.196 Third, the circuit court held
out the possibility that another factor could be added to the
three Boumediene factors it had applied: whether the
Government had detained an individual at a location
specifically to avoid any judicial review of Government
detention decisions.197 The circuit court found that
petitioners‘ arguments in this regard were not substantiated in
the present case, and it therefore made ―no determination of
the importance of this possibility, given that it remains only a
possibility; its resolution can await a case in which the claim
is a reality rather than a speculation.‖198 Avoiding judicial
review was one reason Guantanamo was initially selected by
the Bush Administration,199 but avoiding the application of
U.S. domestic law to an individual already protected under
196
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international law is an operationally sound reason for
bringing a detainee to Bagram. All provisions of the
Constitution are not automatically applicable to all
Government actions everywhere in the world200 – and courts
should therefore very cautiously deal with issues of
Government intent when its actions are in furtherance of its
authority and goals in the area of foreign policy and armed
conflict, and if measures are in place to provide meaningful
administrative review of continued detention, as will be
discussed next.
VII.

THE NEW PARWAN DETENTION FACILITY DETAINEE
REVIEW PROCEDURE

Because the circuit court decided al Maqaleh without
examining the new procedure that has been put in place at the
Parwan Detention Facility, the issue of how much process
Parwan detainees should be afforded in their status
determinations remains to be seen. This is not merely of legal
interest – it is very significant operationally, politically and
from a human rights perspective as the U.S. seeks to maintain
international and particularly NATO support for the ISAF
mission. The new detainee review procedure is based in
large part upon the provisions of Army Regulation 190-8 (AR
190-8), and provides a significant increase in the process
afforded detainees both in terms of initial determinations as
to their status and frequent periodic reviews of those
determinations.201 The first ground for detention is that an
individual must either have been involved in the September
2001 attacks or ―harbored those responsible for those
attacks.‖202 An alternate ground is that an individual was
either part of, or substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaida
forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities
200

See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
201
Letter from Phillip Carter, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
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against the United States or its coalition partners, including
any person who has committed a belligerent act, or has
directly supported hostilities, in aid of such enemy forces.‖203
―The fact that a detainee may have intelligence value, by
itself, is not a basis for internment,‖ and once ―a person
detained by OEF forces is determined not to meet the criteria
detailed above or no longer to require internment to mitigate
their threat, the person shall be released from DOD custody
as soon as practicable.‖204 In terms of process, the first status
review occurs at the level of the capturing unit, generally
within 72 hours, with the advice of a military lawyer.205
Detainees cannot be brought into the Parwan Detention
Facility from the capturing unit unless the Parwan Detention
Facility commander, with the advice of a military attorney,
conducts an entrance status review.206 Within 14 days of a
detainee‘s transfer into the Parwan Detention Facility, the
individual is advised of his rights under the detainee review
procedure, and given an ―unclassified summary of the
specific facts that support the basis for their internment.‖207
Within 60 days of internment, and every six months
afterwards, review boards composed of three commissioned
officers of the rank of major or above will review ―all
reasonably available information to determine whether each
person transferred to the [Parwan Detention Facility] meets
the criteria for internment and, if so, whether the person‘s
continued internment is necessary.‖208 The hearings are
conducted in conformance with AR 190-8, but include
additional process protections for detainees, including the use
of personal representatives to assist detainees in the
preparation of their cases, the investigation of exculpatory
information provided by detainees, a written procedural script
203
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to allow the detainee to better follow the proceedings, and
access to all reasonably available relevant evidence.209 If the
board determines that the detainee does not meet the
requirements for continued internment, then release is to be
made ―as soon as practicable.‖210 If the board finds that the
detainee should be held, it can make one of the following
recommendations to the general officer who convened the
board: ―[c]ontinued internment at the [Parwan Detention
Facility,] . . . transfer to Afghan authorities for criminal
prosecution‖ or ―for participation in a reconciliation
program,‖ ―[r]elease without conditions,‖ or [i]n the case of a
non-Afghan and non-U.S. third country national,‖ either
―transfer to a third country for criminal prosecution,
participation in a reconciliation program, or release.‖211 Each
recommendation for continued internment must be reviewed
for legal sufficiency, and detainees are to receive notice of
review process results within seven days of the legal
review.212
The position of the personal representative is a significant
departure from the process afforded under AR 190-8. The
personal representative must be a commissioned officer
familiar with the detainee review procedures, and have access
to all ―reasonably available information (including classified
information) relevant to the determination of whether the
detainee meets the criteria for internment and whether the
detainee‘s continued internment is necessary.‖213 Personal
representatives are given at least 30 days to prepare for the
hearing. Their appointments may be waived by detainees if
they are 18 years or older, but not if they suffer from a mental
illness, or the general officer convening the hearing
determines that they are ―otherwise incapable of
understanding and participating in the review process.‖214
Although they do not function as advocates before the status
determination board, the personal representatives are required
209
210
211
212
213
214
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to ―assist the detainee in gathering and presenting the
information reasonably available in the light most favorable
to the detainee.‖215 Finally, serving as a personal
representative in good faith will not adversely affect that
officer‘s standing with regard to ―evaluations, promotions,
[or] future assignments.‖216
The new detainee status review procedures differ from
habeas corpus proceedings in significant ways, but not all of
these differences mean that detainees would be afforded only
insufficient process before the detainee review boards. In
keeping with the latitude given the district courts under
Boumediene to devise functional and pragmatic approaches to
hearing detainee habeas corpus petitions,217 at a minimum
detainees are to have notice and an opportunity to be heard,218
to have the right to present documentary evidence and
affidavits,219 the right to present exculpatory evidence,220 and
to have some limited form of discovery consistent with
safeguarding national security concerns.221 Hearsay may be
admitted if its credibility can be properly assessed by the
court,222 and unlike in a more traditional habeas corpus
hearing, the burden is on the government to prove by a
preponderance of evidence223 that the petitioner meets the
standard under the Authorization for the Use of Military
Force as an enemy combatant against whom ―all necessary

215

Id.
Detainee Review Procedures, supra note 10, at 4.
217
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 770 (2008).
218
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004).
219
See id.; Mark D. Falkoff, Back to Basics: Habeas Corpus
Procedures and Long-Term Executive Detention, 86 DENV. U. L. REV.
961, 1007-08 (2009).
220
Id. at 1011-012.
221
See Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 193, 195 (2008)
(discovery motions filed, followed by closed door sessions out of
presence of petitioners to review classified evidence).
222
See id. at 197 (district court‘s assessment of credibility of
particular hearsay evidence).
223
See id. at 195 (citing the Case Management Order promulgated to
assist the district courts in standardizing their approaches to these detainee
cases).
216

2010

Detention Status Review Process

81

and appropriate force‖ may be used.224 The two procedures
are similar then in using the same standard of proof
(preponderance of the evidence), but because the detainee
review board hearing is not truly an adversarial proceeding,
the government does not have the burden of persuasion.
Detainee access to classified information is limited in both,225
both consider evidence potentially inadmissible at a criminal
trial, and both have open hearings unless closed for
classification reasons. Neither requires defense counsel, and
neither determines guilt of any criminal offense.226 In terms
of differences, defense counsel is allowed at habeas corpus
hearings, but not before review boards, although detainees are
afforded personal representatives if they wish. Additionally,
an independent judge makes the final determination as to
whether the detainee should be held or released, as compared
to the review board‘s ability to order release. Further, the
general officer convening the board makes the final decision
whether to continue detention upon review board
recommendation, with legal advice. The net result of this
difference is similar to that under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, in which acquittals at the trial level are not
reviewed by the convening authority, but all convictions must
undergo convening authority review and determination,
because findings of guilt and adjudged punishments are
recommendations in effect only.227
The impartiality of the board is enhanced, however, by
not allowing those officers who might have been involved in
the case to sit on the board. A further significant difference is
that the government is required to investigate exculpatory
information offered by the detainee, which presumably
includes classified information available to the personal
representative. A final important difference is the precise
224
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standard of proof the evidence must meet by a preponderance
of the evidence. The definition used by the district court in
the Boumediene habeas corpus hearing addresses:
[A]n individual who was part of or supporting
Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated
forces that are engaged in hostilities against
the United States or its coalition partners. This
includes any person who has committed a
belligerent act or has directly supported
hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.228
As applied by the district court to the petitioners in the
Boumediene habeas corpus hearing, the term ―support‖ meant
―direct support,‖ such as ―facilitating the travel of others to
join the fight against the United States in Afghanistan. . .‖229
Significantly, as of March 13, 2009, the Obama
Administration defined those at Guantanamo who may be
detained as
[p]ersons
who
planned,
authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001, and persons
who harbored those responsible for those
attacks [and] [p]ersons who were part of, or
substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaida
forces or associated forces that are engaged in
hostilities against the United States or its
coalition partners, including any person who
has committed a belligerent act, or has directly
supported hostilities, in aid of such enemy
armed forces.230
This definition was adopted for the detainees at the Parwan
Detention Facility on July 2, 2009. The Obama
Administration‘s definition appears to set a lower standard
228
229
230

added).
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than that used in habeas hearings before the Boumediene
district court and other district courts.231 Although the
administration‘s standard may not suffice for domestic legal
proceedings, it is consistent with international humanitarian
law, for example, in terms of holding security detainees under
Geneva Convention IV.232 As previously noted, some
commentators and scholars take the position that human
rights law should provide the applicable rules and guidance in
these cases when a conflict is neither a strict international nor
non-international armed conflict.233 This perspective,
however, ignores the positions of the states which created our
current understanding of what these two terms mean. If the
states did not even want the basic provisions of Common
Article 3 to apply to these other kinds of armed conflict, it
does not follow that they would want the robust protections
of human rights law applied to these conflicts.234 Instead,
whether one takes the view that authority to detain on this
basis outlined by the Obama Administration is already part of
applicable customary international law regardless of the
nature of the conflict,235 or that it should be applied by way of
analogy under the concept of transnational armed conflict,
this standard is functionally appropriate in a conflict such as
231
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the one the U.S. is fighting with al Qaeda and associated
groups – a fight which transcends the accepted definitions of
armed conflict covered by the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
In sum, the impartiality of the board, the use of the
personal representative, the frequency of review, the tests for
legal sufficiency at different stages of the process, access to
information justifying the detention, the investigation of
exculpatory evidence, presence at the proceedings, the
opportunity to address the board, and the use of written
scripts and interpreters add substantive process to the
Detainee Review Procedures. Although this is less process
than that afforded in habeas corpus proceedings, the Detainee
Review Procedures provide sufficient process to address what
appears to be the U.S. Supreme Court‘s underlying concern
in Boumediene – the possibility of executive detention of
individuals indefinitely without providing a fair mechanism
to have the reasons for their continued detention reviewed
periodically and meaningfully. To date, little in the way of
independent assessments of the Detainee Review Boards
using the new procedures has been published. One reporter,
however, based upon his observation of five board hearings
in March 2010, noted that detainees made use of their right to
call witnesses in their behalf, and that the personal
representatives ―felt free to advocate on behalf of a detainee,
challenge the factual record, and ensure that the detainee
understood the procedures.‖236 The same reporter, however,
suggested areas for improvement: avoiding the overclassification of classified material so that detainees can
actually review more of it rather than limiting review to just
the personal representative, purging unreliable intelligence
sources, and increasing staffing of the boards, to include
additional and better qualified translators and more personal
representatives.237
236

Jonathon Horowitz, New Detention Rules Show Promise and
Problems, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 20, 2010,
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CONCLUSION

As noted previously, either because of the Circuit Court‘s
decision on the Al Maqaleh case, or even if the issue is
mooted at some point along the appeals path through transfer
of the Parwan Detention Facility to the control of the Afghan
government, the overarching question as to the appropriate
detention status review mechanism to be used in the cases of
detainees captured in an on-going transnational conflict such
as the one between the U.S. and its allies and al Qaeda and its
affiliates will still remain. Were the U.S. Supreme Court to
hear the case, proper application of the analysis from its
decision in Boumediene should result in a holding that the
Suspension Clause is not applicable to the Parwan Detention
Facility regardless of the nationality of the petitioner. The
limited nature of the leased U.S. occupancy of Bagram; the
permission granted under the status of forces arrangement for
the lawful presence of U.S. forces within the sovereign
territory of Afghanistan; the presence of international forces
under international command on the base; and the lack of
U.S. jurisdiction over non-U.S. personnel, both military and
civilian, serve to make Bagram much like any other overseas
U.S. military base, but not part of the United States as
Guantanamo is under Boumediene. The location of the
Parwan Detention Facility in an active combat zone which is
also the focus of transnational terrorist‘s armed and logistical
activities further distinguishes it from the detention situation
at Guantanamo. Additionally, the new Detainee Review
Procedures provide sufficient process to non-U.S. national
detainees to prevent the possibility of erroneous and
indefinite executive detention, although their efficacy could
possibly be improved through different information
classification procedures and increased Detention Review
Board personnel quantity and language capability.
Importantly, individuals may not be held merely for their
―shall assist the detainee in gathering and presenting the information
reasonably available in the light most favorable to the detainee,‖ an issue
which remains to be clarified is the degree of confidentially that exists
between the personal representative and the detainee. Detainee Review
Procedures, supra note 10, at 6.
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intelligence value; rather, they must be shown by a
preponderance of the evidence to have either been involved
in the September 2001 attacks or to have directly supported al
Qaeda or the Taliban in hostilities against U.S. or allied
forces since then.
Certain commentators have suggested that setting the
standard for continued detention too high leads to an
unpleasant paradox. For example, the standard for deciding
whether to engage an individual with up to lethal force is
reasonable certainty, based upon the entire intelligence
picture known at that time that the individual is taking a
direct part in hostilities. Reasonable certainty in a combat
environment could be equated with probable cause. As noted
by D.C. District Court Judge Richard Leon in his
memorandum order documenting his decision on Mr.
Boumediene‘s habeas petition, the standard for continued
detention of an alleged al Qaeda fighter is preponderance of
the evidence that the individual meets the definition of one
who may be detained under the AUMF.238 This requires the
court itself to independently assess the credibility of the
government‘s evidence proffered to justify continued
detention. Judge Leon further noted with regard to the
government‘s evidence regarding Boumediene,
[s]uffice it to say, however, that while the
information in the classified intelligence
report, relating to the credibility and reliability
of the source, was undoubtedly sufficient for
the intelligence purposes for which it was
prepared, it is not sufficient for the purposes
for which a habeas court must now evaluate it.
To allow enemy combatancy to rest on so thin
a reed would be inconsistent with the Court‘s
obligation under the Supreme Court‘s decision
238
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in Hamdi to protect petitioners from the risk of
erroneous detention.239
Requiring a higher standard for security detention than that
required for lethal action could lead to an incentive to kill
rather than capture.240 This incentive would not necessarily
be equally applicable to all targets – the incentive to capture
leaders or particularly well-known fighters because of their
intelligence or psychological value could be greater than for
targets assessed to be mere foot soldiers. Realistically,
however, targeted terrorists and insurgents are perhaps more
likely to be killed simply because missions to capture them
would entail greater risk of collateral damage to civilians and
civilian property, or unacceptable risk to friendly personnel
and equipment, rather than an assessment that the legal case
against them at some detention review procedure in the future
is weak compared to their potential intelligence value.
The new Parwan Detention Facility procedures are
defended better on less speculative grounds. Although the
standard for continued detention is not as rigorous as that
which has been applied in habeas corpus hearings in the D.C
District Court,241 it is appropriate in a transnational armed
conflict in which non-U.S. nationals are being held outside
the U.S. by U.S. forces in an area of active combat.
Fortunately, the detainee review boards are not conducted in
the heat of battle, but they are held in an austere setting
within danger‘s reach. In light of the significant process given
to detainees under the new Detainee Review Procedures,
process which actually moves the standard for determining
whether an individual should continue to be detained in the
direction of international human rights law principles, judicial
deference should also be accorded to the military decisions
that flow from the effective implementation of these
procedures.242 These procedures will strike a practical
239
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balance between the deployed forces‘ needs for intelligence
and security,243 the need to minimize the logistical burden
placed upon deployed resources by housing, feeding and
protecting a detention facility population,244 the need to
minimize opportunities for radicalization among detainees,245
and importantly, the detainees‘ and their families‘ need to
know there is a predictable and logical process that supports
their hope of regaining their freedom at a more definite point
in the future.246 The process and transparency the procedures
provide for detainees taken in the course of transnational
armed conflict should be seen as a model for status
determination in future detention operations, and importantly,
in keeping with the concept of transnational armed conflict,
they have the potential to flesh out a new area of substantive
customary international humanitarian law protections for
detainees in conflicts other than those considered
international or non-international under the 1949 Geneva
Conventions.
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